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BOYCO'ITS AND RESTRICTIVE MARKETING 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Richard M. Buxbaum* 
I T is currently a common if still relatively unheralded practice for a "fired" dealer to bring an antitrust action against his 
former manufacturer-supplier (and perhaps other dealers), alleg-
ing that his termination was the result of a boycott.1 Boycotts-
collective efforts to obtain the exclusion of a party from a market-
are illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 Thus, ques-
tions concerning the justification for the boycott or the significance 
of the offender's market position do not arise.3 
A related but even more obscure development in these situ-
ations is the growing use of the allegation that the acts complained 
of constituted an attempt to monopolize a usually unspecified 
market.4 While attempts to monopolize are less clearly per se 
offenses, and while the proper definition of the relevant market 
in such cases is still a matter of debate,5 it is likely that only the 
difficulty of proving a specific intent to monopolize stands in the 
way of success in most of these cases.6 If boycott law or flexible "at-
tempt to monopolize" rules can be applied to the acts of business-
men who dismiss distributors for failing to comply with restrictive 
marketing arrangements, much of the current debate over sub-
stantive standards may be moot. It seems necessary, therefore, to 
explore both the concept and scope of the prohibition against boy-
cotts, and its proper place in the marketing field. It should then 
• Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.-Ed. 
I should like to thank Professor Thomas E. Kauper of The University of Michigan 
Law School for his painstaking critique of the manuscript, without, however, imputing 
to him any responsibility for its shortcomings. 
1. Even commentators who are critical of the developing substantive law fre-
quently accept this approach without question. See, e.g., Potvin, Choosing and Drop-
ping Distributors, 26 A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRusr LAW PROCEEDINGS 99 (1964). 
2. Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
3. See Ol'l'ENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRusr LAws 661 (2d ed. 1959). 
4. See, e.g., Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964); Bragen v. 
Hudson County News Co., 321 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1963); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959); A-1 Business Machs. Co. v. Undenvood Corp., 
216 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 
F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962). 
5. Compare United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395-96, 423 
n.23 (1956), with United States v. Chas. Pfizer &: Co., 245 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). 
See also Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281, 294 
(1956). 
6. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
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become evident that the boycott concept is itself too vague, and 
has been too loosely· applied, to be useful in judging marketing 
practices. At the same time, it will be shown that the boycott pro• 
hibition is not necessary for condemning those practices found 
illegal under applicable substantive standards. A similar if less 
elaborate review of the law on attempts to monopolize should like-
wise show that problems inherent in the use of the allegation of 
attempted monopolization in such marketing complaints militate 
against its acceptance, and that this allegation is also not necessary 
to condemn practices which are illegal under the developing sub-
stantive standards. 
Although the for~going comments do not directly concern the 
substantive standards of the legitimacy of the various restrictive 
marketing arrangements whose termination occasions litigation,7 
those standards are at present a matter of such dispute that a brief 
sketch of the field is in order. The distribution of goods through 
independent channels has always troubled antitrust policy makers, 
since the effect of such exclusive arrangements upon competition 
is ambivalent. On the one hand, competition in the distribution 
of the particular goods being marketed is restrained, or manu-
facturers of competing goods are foreclosed from certain distribu-
tion channels. On the other hand, the same practices may strengthen 
competition between the goods being distributed through indepen• 
dent channels and the goods of other producers. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that 
it is groping for standards to apply to these distribution arrange• 
ments;8 however, its tentative list of criteria is still extremely 
vague.9 The developing standards may vary with the particular 
practice. There are indications that a territorial restriction differs 
in legality from a promise not to handle competing goods,10 and 
7. See, e.g., Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws-
A Reappraisal, 40 N.C.L. REv. 223 (1962); Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales AreaJ 
Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 111 (1962); Robinson, Restraints on 
Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1960); Stone, Closed 
Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the Sherman Act, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 
286 (1963). 
8. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Cases now pending 
offer an opportunity for further clarification. See United States v. Arnold Schwinn &: 
Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill.), prob. juris. noted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3197 (U.S. 
Dec. 7, 1965); United States v. General Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal. 1964), 
prob. juris. noted, 380 U.S. 940 (1965). However, the General Motors case is cssen• 
tially a resale or collective price-fixing situation. 
9. See Stewart, Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of Distributors, 22 
A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRusr I.Aw PROCEEDINGS 33 (1963); Panel Discussion on Vertical 
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, id. at 120, 126-27, 129-31 (1963). 
IO. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), and Snap-On 
Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963), with Standard Oil Co, of Cal, v. 
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that exclusive requirements contracts are to be treated differently 
from tie-in arrangements.11 More important, the legal standards 
may vary from well-established economic standards. An economist 
studying industrial organization judges the tie-in, the promise not to 
handle competing goods, and the exclusive requirements contract all 
by their direct preclusive effect upon competitors of the manufac-
turer in their efforts to sell goods.12 The exclusive dealership, the 
territorial limitation, the customer restriction, and the vertical price-
fixing agreement, on the other hand, interest the economist 
because of their direct effect upon the competitive purchasing 
opportunities of customers for a particular manufacturer's prod-
uct.18 Although one formal legal distinction corresponds to this 
economic one-the latter practices essentially fall under section I of 
the Sherman Act, while the former fall under both section I of the 
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act-the substantive legal 
standards currently developing do not seem to fall into line on the 
basis of that distinction. If any characterization of the developing 
legal standards is possible, it may be this: Some authorities would 
adopt objective "share of the market" data as dispositive through-
out,14 while others would use a test which balances various justifica-
tions against the indispensability of the practice for achieving the 
justified end.15 In each camp, however, the other's primary tests seem 
to be employed as important secondary tests. The foregoing classifi-
cation does not hint at "hard" or "soft" lines when one gets down 
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), and Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 
534 (D.C. Cir. 1962). . 
C 
11. Compare Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), with 
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), and United States v. Loew's 
Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). But cf. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965). 
12. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 
25•27 (1957): Burstein, A Theory of Full Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960); 
Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 552 (1965); Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in 
Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 
65 HARV. L. REV. 913, 942-48 (1952). 
13. See Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Pub-
lic Policy Standards, 30 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 506 (1965). This is an illustration of 
the "structure-behavior" interaction which is common in current economic descrip-
tions. See BAIN, INDUSI'RIAL ORGANIZATION (1958). 
In the long run, of course, these effects merge. The impact of the first group of 
practices upon the structure of the supplier market in time will have consequences 
for the choices open to customers. But economists find it useful to separate these 
short-range and long-range effects for analysis, and on the whole the decisions seem 
to -be following this approach. But see United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 
44-45 (1962). . 
14. See Rahl, Antitrust Policy in Distribution, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 185, 199 (1955). 
15. See, e.g., Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 
45 CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1960); Smith, Vertical Arrangements in Antitrust Law: Exclusive 
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to cases. The second group contains ·writers to whom the necessity 
of a given practice to achieve the justified goal is often self-evident,10 
as well as writers who are ingenious at suggesting equally efficient 
but less restrictive provisions and who therefore condemn the given 
practice.17 
It seems clear that the substantive debate is important enough 
to justify the following effort to clarify the concepts being used in 
that debate. In any event, I would assert that some debate over 
substantive standards is still possible, and that "per se" rules have 
not taken over the entire field of restrictive vertical distribution 
arrangements. Whether one speaks of "per se" versus "rule of rea-
son" standards in substantive terms, or, more appropriately, sees 
the rule of reason as a method of inquiry into the degree of specific 
proof or defense appropriate to a given practice,18 some defensive 
possibilities exist even for such flagrant pract~~es as tie-ins and 
promises not to handle competing goods.19 At the other extreme, 
formidable proof requirements quite obviously still exist with re-
gard to territorial limitations and exclusive requirements con-
tracts.20 
I. BoYcorrs 
Several types of practices are encompassed by the term "boy-
cott," and therefore some system of classification is required before 
a proper analysis of such practices can be undertaken. These prac-
tices fall into two main groups: collective boycotts and "boycotts" 
by single entities enjoying a dominant or monopolistic market 
position. 
' 
A. Collective Boycotts 
Generally speaking, an economic boycott requires the coopera-
tion of a party at a different level in the distribution process from 
Dealing Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 18 (1963). 
In this general field, Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive 
Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 267, 290-319, remains the 
most ambitious effort to evaluate various justifications and develop from them stan-
dards for decision. 
16. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 15; Stewart, Franchise or Protected Territory 
Distribution, 8 ANTITRUST BuLL. 447 (1963). 
17. See, e.g., Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 795 (1962). 
18. See Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964). 
19. In lieu of detailed citations, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
329-31 (1962). 
20. See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text. See also KAYSEN &: TURNER, ANTI• 
TRUST POLICY 157-80 (1959). 
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that on which the instigators operate.21 Even though members of 
an industry wish to punish or eliminate a certain competitor, they 
can do so only by inducing the competitor's customers or suppliers 
to stop dealing with him. This they may do, however, by threaten-
ing in tum to stop dealing with the competitor's customers or sup-
pliers. If such coercive action is adopted, it may be difficult to 
isolate the offensive practice. The cases are surprisingly vague. If 
the original threat by the initiators is the illegal act, then the stress 
is upon the means, and the legitimacy of the end is irrelevant. The 
cases seem to make this the crucial point. The combination-the 
collective agreement needed to bring the transaction within section 
1 of the Sherman Act-is the arrangement between the manufac-
turers who agree to boycott retailers who will not act in the desired 
fashion vis-a-vis the competing manufacturer.22 Thus the retailers, 
as well as the competing manufacturer, are the victims. The ex-
ample may be turned around if it is a group of retailers who wish 
to punish one of their number; indeed, the latter is the more com-
mon case. 
As evidenced by the facts in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores,23 such a combination may be operative at the respond-
ing level as well as at the inducing level. It was alleged that 
defendant Broadway-Hale objected to price-cutting on several 
appliance lines by its retail competitor, Klor's, and therefore in-
duced a variety of suppliers (who were also defendants) to cease 
dealing with Klor's. It is clear that the original interests sought to 
be protected were those of Broadway~Hale; at least it was Broad-
way-Hale which allegedly complained of Klor's price-cutting and 
used the leverage of its purchasing power to persuade its suppliers 
to boycott Klor's.24 If Broadway-Hale had gone to only one supplier 
21. This discussion does not deal with fully voluntary boycotts, in which all 
members on a given level in the competitive process participate in order to achieve 
common goals. Arrangements of this nature may require an agreement to refuse to 
deal with certain parties at a different level in the distribution process. See, e.g., 
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &: Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), where Seagram 
and Calvert were found to have agreed not to sell liquor to Indiana wholesalers who 
would not resell below a price ceiling. 
22. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
The combination may be a mixed one including vertically related parties as well. See, 
e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light &: Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659 (1961). 
Again, the emphasis is upon the joint action of the inducing parties, and as the fol-
lowing textual discussion will demonstrate, this is the proper approach. For a dis-
cussion of the various possible combinations, see Turner, The Definition of Agreement 
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusal To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 
655, 685-86 (1962). 
23. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
24. Id. at 209. 
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and persuaded it to discontinue sales to K.lor's, the "boycott" might 
not have been established, even though the effect would have been 
identical.25 On the other hand, if Broadway-Hale and other re-
tailers had concertedly coerced the same supplier, there would 
have been a collective boycott at the initiating level.26 
0 
There is often distinguished a type of "boycott," or collective 
refusal to deal, which is thought to be a price-fixing agreement in 
disguise. Vertical price-fixing contracts, whereby even a single retailer 
agrees to resell goods purchased from a supplier at the prices set by 
the latter, are illegal per se under the rule laid down in Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park &- Sons.27 This doctrine, which is an 
exception to current rules governing analogous vertical arrange-
ments (such as territorial divisions and end-customer restrictions), 
was bound to conflict with notions of the individual trader's right 
of unilateral refusal to deal. Yet if we ignore non-economic 
motives for such refusals,28 it should be apparent that almost all 
refusals to deal are a means of achieving or maintaining some vertical 
control such as price maintenance, customer restrictions, or manu-
facturer or dealer exclusives. 
In the vertical price-maintenance area, boycott notions have 
been combined with the Dr. Miles per se rule and with newer con-
cepts of "implied conspiracy," so as to negate any realistic possi-
bility that a manufacturer could refuse to deal with a price-cutting 
distributor.29 This result is exemplified by United States v. Parke, 
Davis &- Co.,30 which involved a fairly typical effort to police retail 
25. Cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C, Cir,), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). A rare dictum to the contrary, applying boycott 
principles to a two-party vertical arrangement, is found in United States v. New York 
Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir, 1949), See Note, 51 CALIF. L, REv. 
608, 618-19 (1963). 
26. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
27. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For the basis of this rule, at least in part, in the dislike of 
restraints on alienation, see Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on 
Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 258, 270·78. 
28. I find it puzzling that commentators tend to overemphasize this freedom to 
refuse to deal for non-economic motives. See, e.g., Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts 
Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA, L. REv. 1165, 1171 
(1959). The two types of motive are adequately distinguishable, and difficulties with 
nonrestrictive motives, or even with "ethical" motives that have a peripheral restric• 
tive tendency, need not be imported into the field here under discussion. That is an 
instance where super-fine analysis _only confuses the issues. 
29. This conclusion is challenged by Fulda, Individual Refusals To Deal: When 
Does Single Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB, 590 
(1965), but-subject to the discussion in note 54 infra-I do not believe he has refuted 
the existence of this trend. Compare Kessler &: Stem, Competition, Contract, and 
Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 41-42 (1959). 
30. 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
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prices by cutting off supplies to mavericks. Certainly the few "spe• 
cial" facts mentioned by the court-inducing wholesalers to stop 
dealing with offending retailers, and obtaining explicit agreement 
of the retailers to stop price advertising-would not be unusual 
components in most market situations. 
Although even this decision does not clearly characterize the re-
fusal to deal, the "boycott" conspiracy involved was that between the 
"web" of distributors who entered into a horizontal agreement to 
achieve price uniformity at their level. It is possible to see the two-
party vertical agreement between Parke, Davis and a dealer as the 
operative conspiracy or agreement if the arrangement is successful.81 
The finding of a conspiracy is hardly possible, however, if the plan 
fails because one of the two parties involved declines to conspire.82 
If, on the other hand, the operative conspiracy is that of the retailers.. 
to secure price discipline, then violation of the law is practically auto• · 
matic. The concerted action results either in compliance by or 
punishment of the offending retailer, and in both cases there is no 
denying the existence of the conspiracy. In effect, the operative 
"refusal to deal" in most of the price-fixing cases is not collective, 
but rather is a responding sanction imposed by the supplier.38 There 
was in Parke, Davis, as in Klor's, an implicit inducing refusal to deal 
by the retailers, but it was more hidden and did not figure in the 
court's analysis except to suggest the necessary multiplicity of con-
spirators. This case development away from the single-party vertical 
agreement to the collective horizontal or mixed conspiracy eases the 
search for a unified approach to judging all such restrictions, as does 
the relaxing of requirements for finding a "conspiracy," which was 
influenced by the per se illegality of resale price agreements. · 
31. "Parke Davis created a combination with the retailers and the wholesalers to 
maintain retail prices •••• " Id. at 45. "The product then comes packaged in a com-
petition-free wrapping ••• by virtue of concerted action induced by the manufacturer. 
The manufacturer is thus the organizer of a price-maintenance combination or con-
spiracy in violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 47. See also note 22 supra. 
This seems to be the result in the closely analogous case of Simpson v. Union 
Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). In Simpson "there was an agreement for resale price 
maintenance, coercively employed." Id. at 24. (Emphasis added.) The last two words 
quoted-"coercively employed"-are properly the subject of speculation. See Handler, 
Recent Antitrust Developments-1961, 63 MICH, L. REv. 59, 62-65 (1964). 
32, Possibly one could characterize the compliant distributor and the manufacturer 
as conspirators in their effort to bring a rebelling distributor back into the fold. Their 
lack of success could then be shrugged aside under the decision in United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
33. Even if the supplier is often cast in the role of the activist, as in Parke, Davis, 
this only obscures the fact that his decision to maintain a certain retail pricing image 
is a response to the vagaries of the retail market structure as he finds it, and an attempt 
to maximize his profit within that framework. Compare text accompanying notes 
49.53 infra. 
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In summary, "collective refusals to deal," which have been pro-
hibited since the Supreme Court decision in Fashion Originators' 
Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,34 constitute not one but several prac-
tices. The initiator may be an individual or a group. In cases where 
the initiator is acting alone, the responding patties-those wielding 
the direct club against the maverick-must be multiple. 
B. Boycotts by Monopolists 
Boycotts by monopolists also encompass differing practices. The 
standard example of such conduct may be found in Lorain Journal 
Co. v. United States,85 where a monopolist wishing to eliminate a 
minor competitor threatened to discontinue sales to buyers of ad-
vertising space unless they agreed to stop dealing with the com-
petitor. Again, an inducing and a responding refusal to deal were 
involved, and again, the former arrangement was the important one. 
The case might have been disposed of by finding a collective con-
spiratorial response by the advertisers in the Klor' s sense or, more 
accurately, in the sense of an implied conspiracy like that found in 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States.86 Such a disposition was 
deemed unnecessary, since the initiating party had a dominant 
market position. Apparently the boycott-initiating act amply satis-
fied the conduct requirement of the "monopolize" or "attempt to 
monopolize" language of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
As a general rule, however, the prohibition of a refusal to deal 
as part of an attempt to monopolize goes far beyond the field of 
two-lev~l boycotts. One of the older cases, which is often cited to 
overcome the absence of a collective act at either level of the boy-
cott situation, is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials 
34. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
35. 342 U.S. 143 (1951). 
36. 306 U.S. 208 (1939). See also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 
(1942). The "invitation to a common end," which is condemned in these cases, re• 
quires the coordinated or simultaneous movement of the invitees into the transaction 
upon request of the instigator, and thus, strictly speaking, may be too restricted a 
doctrine to explain Klor's. However, the Court's concern with the coordinated aban• 
donment of price advertising in Parke, Davis is explainable in these terms. For efforts 
to expand the limits of this doctrine, or perhaps to merge all of these notions into a 
general doctrine of conspiracy, compare Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., 325 
F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963), with Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 
(3d Cir. 1963). In any event, it does not appear that the courts are very much con• 
cerned with labeling the exact sub-species of the conspiracy doctrine with which they 
justify a decision, and probably would not stick at the "simultaneous movement" 
requirement if it ever were an issue in litigation. For an attempt to reconcile these 
cases, see Fulda, supra note 29, at 597. 
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Co.87 In that case the "boycotter" was seeking vertical integration for-
ward into the distribution field, and when· its effort to buy out a 
local distributor of its product failed, it refused to continue supply-
ing the distributor. This conduct was successfully challenged as an 
illegal refusal to deal, since it was undertaken in furtherance of 
Eastman Kodak's monopolization of the relevant market. In this 
context, of course, Southern Photo's complaint was an effort to 
prevent vertical integration and to freeze an existing distribution 
framework for a particular product line. Nevertheless, the inte-
gration effort was not judged on the same basis as a merger, but 
rather on almost a "per se" footing.38 
The antitrust law's feeble grapplings with dual distribution 
problems are reflected in Eastman Kodak. It is reminiscent of 
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,89 at least as the latter 
is described in Mr. Justice Harlan's diss~nt. Furthermore, the revul-
sion of the courts against a manufacturer who "steals a march" on 
independent distributors because of his integrated, "cheaper" struc-
ture is obvious here. This attitude is evidenced in some dubious 
vertical integration cases, 40 and it is also apparent in attacks on resale 
price maintenance41 and price discrimination42 by dual-functioning 
37. 273 U.S. 359 (1927). See also United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 
F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945). 
38. Strictly speaking, where there is an adequate relevant market, Eastman Kodak's 
method of vertical integration should be a per se violation, but the whole point is that 
the Court apparently will accept any definition of that market. The foregoing state-
ment may be disputable if applied directly to Eastman Kodak itself, but it very clearly 
characterizes the use of Eastman Kodak in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 
368 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1962). This result is in contrast to the more rigorous approach 
to completed monopolies under § 2 of the Clayton Act. See United States v. E. I. du-
Pont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Indeed, the Poller decision is similar to 
the looser approach toward attempts to monopolize, id. at 395 n.23 and toward 
mergers -under § 7 of the Clayton Act, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294, 325 (1962). 
39. 368 U.S. 464 (1962). For present purposes, it is interesting to note the factual 
context of the Poller decision. The Columbia Broadcasting System purchased a local 
station, and thereafter refused to deal further with another competing local station. 
CBS transferred the network programming from the latter station to its new sub-
sidiary. 
40. See, e.g., United States v. New York Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 
(7th Cir. 1949); Reynolds Metals Co. v. ITC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also 
Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 27, 53-57 (1949); Adel-
man, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1289, 1312-17 
(1948). 
41. United States v. McKesson &: Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). 
42. See Borden Co. v. ITC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. 
WEEK 3117 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1965). See also Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 
1956). Unfortunately, the best discussion of all aspects of dual distribution channels 
is not available in English. See JACOB-STEINORTH, DER ZWEIGLEISIGE VERTRIEB VON 
MARKENWAREN IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN REcHT (1964). A shorter, more xlar-
rowly based study is Jordan, The Robinson-Patman Act Aspects of Dual Distribution 
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manufacturers. The mixture of unfair competition doctrines with 
antitrust laws has produced an odd blend, but that is a separate story. 
The practice which has been described herein as a "monopolistic 
refusal to deal" is only tangentially to be classified as a per se boycott 
offense.48 
I!. BOYCOTTS AS A PROHIBITED MEANS OF ENFORCING RESTRICTIVE 
DISTRIBUTION .ARRANGEMENTS 
This review of the practices which are commonly lumped to-
gether under the "boycott" label suggests that the term itself is too 
loosely and variously used to be appropriate for accurate character-
.ization of the legal status of such activity. In addition, and as the 
following discussion will demonstrate in greater detail, the per se 
illegality of most of these boycott situations cannot be appropriately 
attached to such practices. Indeed, if such labels were appropriate, 
all restrictive distribution contracts would eventually be illegal, 
for the refusal to deal as a sanction to obtain or repress certain be-
havior is a self-evident companion of all restrictive marketing ar-
rangements, or, in other words, of all manufacturers' arrangements 
in imperfectly competitive markets.44 
The basic question is this: If a given restrictive distribution 
arrangement is legitimate in its factual context, can its enforcement 
be considered illegal once it is characterized as a boycott? A grow-
ing number of cases seem to indicate that this question should be 
answered affirmatively. For example, in McElhenney Co. v. West-
ern Auto Supply45 former franchise holders of Western Auto com-
plained of the termination of their franchise, alleging that it 
occurred because of their refusal to stop selling competing prod-
ucts. A remand to allow amended pleadings that properly alleged 
a "conspiracy" was granted, the court recognizing the legitimacy of 
"unilateral refusals to deal" but condemning a restrictive course of 
by Brand of Consumer Goods, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 394 (1965). It is hoped that the Su• 
preme Court's opinion in Borden will stimulate further discussion of these problems, 
which touch on unfair competition as well as price discrimination. 
43. Perhaps these "monopolization" cases are best classified by comparing them to 
"collective boycott" de_cisions, which really involve the exercise of market power by 
members of an association with membership barriers. See note 21 supra. If so, the 
analogy between Eastman Kodak and Poller and such cases as Associated Press v. Taft• 
Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965), and United 
States v. Insurance Bd. of Cleveland, 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960), should be 
explored. See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Turner, 
supra note 22, at 666-67. 
44. See Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121 (1949). 
45. 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959). 
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dealing between seller and buyer46 that might ripen into an implied 
understanding. The court went" on to say that a treble damage 
action could be based only upon an autonomous violation of the 
antitrust laws-here section 3 of the Clayton Act.47 In testing the 
pleadings under that section, however, the court merely repeated that 
the asserted distinction between unilateral and consensual refusals 
to deal was dispositive of the legality of the practice.48 Neither the 
relevancy of the line of commerce nor the substantiality of the effect 
upon competition was even broached. 
This approach may achieve undue respectability as a result of 
certain language in Mr. Justice Brennan's co~curring opinion in 
White Motor Co. v. United States.49 Seeking guidelines with which 
to judge territorially protected exclusive-distribution arrangements, 
he looked first to the circumstances of their genesis. He felt that if 
these exclusive arrangements were "essentially" the work of a 
horizontal agreement among dealers rather than an expression of 
the manufacturer's interests, then they would be illegal.50 This is 
usually not a useful line of inquiry. As an influential student com-
ment51 had already pointed out, the manufacturer's own interest 
in effective distribution often dictates his yielding to dealers' in-
sistence on exclusivity.52 Territorial security will be a major de-
mand of any potential distributor-even one acting autonomously 
-so the prevalence of territorial-security clauses proves nothing. 
There may be an occasional situation where a joint demand for 
territorial security by a group of potential distributors achieves for 
each a position that no individual would have had sufficient lever-
age to obtain. This rare case can be condemned. The. pressure for 
such provisions, however, is undoubtedly a factor in most negotia-
tions, and a supplier's stand in the face of that pressure depends upon 
t:he bargaining distributor's leverage-the distribution potential he 
seems to offer the supplier in comparison with other alternatives.58 
46. Italics are supplied to call into question the court's preoccupation wit!). the 
two-party, vertical course of dealing. 
47. See 269 F.2d at 337. 
48. Id. at 337-38. 
49. 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963). 
50. Id. at 267. 
51. Note, 75 HARv. L. REY. 795 (1962). 
52. "But an approach that attempts to determine which party's interest or initiative 
is more fully served by the agreement encounters difficulties; for the most significant 
interests of the manufacturers are themselves framed in terms of the interests of the 
dealer." Id. at 825. (This note was cited several times in Mr. Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion.) But see Turner, supra note 22, at 698-99. 
53. This includes other potential distributors with whom a better bargain might 
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Such considerations are only subsidiary to the issue that should 
be the central concern of the law in this field: the degree to which 
territorial-protection clauses narrow customer choices of alterna-
tive offerings of that supplier's product. To concentrate on "con-
spiracy" would be useless in most situations and, if uncritically 
extended to what I posit as the "normal" case, would be unduly 
harsh. Indeed, if a multitude of dealers make the same demand, 
even if the later ones to do so are influenced by the earlier de-
mands of the others, a conspiracy (actual or implied) is still not 
made out. At the least, Turner's ·objection, put forth in a different 
structural context, to condemning ambiguous conduct which can be 
characterized as either autonomous or collective behavior is equally 
applicable in this situation. 54 
Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motor gives 
too much weight to these conspiracy concepts and to other non-
quantifiable aspects of distribution arrangements. The relative 
need for the territorial-protection provision to achieve the asserted 
end is made too important a factor in the evaluation of the legality 
of the provision.55 It is true that Mr. Justice Brennan does not 
entirely ignore the dealer's local market position and the manu-
facturer's more general "share of the market"66 and both approaches 
are thus available for further development. At present, however, 
the notion of collective conspiracy in the creation of restrictive 
be struck as well as vertically integrated distribution efforts, which might be more 
favorable despite the initial investment required. 
54. See Turner, supra note 22, at 666, 671, 683. Fulda, supra note 29, secs the 
problem entirely as one of conspiratorial refusals to deal, and seeks to show-by use 
of essentially the same group of cases -used herein-that the courts (at least some• 
times) are reluctant to draw the full consequences from their acceptance of conspiracy 
allegations, and thus often find for defendants on the merits. Such reluctance is to 
be expected, but to leave the matter there is to accept a jungle of ill-articulated cases 
(see id. at 605 n.82), tortuous distinctions (see id. at 595-97), and impossible dogma 
(see the discussion of "mere switching of distributors," id. at 597 n.46). Further, it 
forces use of the "no completed contract" error in Clayton Act § 3 cases (see text 
accompanying notes 78-85 infra) in order to hold tie-in and exclusive dealing provi-
sions to the same standards as those applied to Sherman Act § 1 restrictions-a result 
running counter to the scheme of the section. For an attempt to use a generous con• 
spiracy doctrine to overcome the latter objection, coupled with an uncritical acceptance 
of the conspiracy theory in the entire restrictive distribution field, see Comment, 
64 YALE L.J. 581 (1953). It still seems preferable to attempt a conceptual synthesis 
of the field. -
55. See 372 U.S. at 269-70. For even less appealing discussions, sec Snap-On Tools 
Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 
&: Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill.), prob. juris. noted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3197 (U.S. 
Dec. 7, 1965). 
56. See 372 U.S. at 268. Compare Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 
320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
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distribution arrangements has borne unwelcome fruit in litigation 
concerning the termination of such arrangements. 
Many of the cases which discuss termination of distribution 
contracts display an uncritical acceptance of the idea that collusion 
is the key to a finding of illegality.57 This is not surprising, since 
even some older decisions rejected attacks upon terminations of 
distributorships on the ground that producers are always free to 
refuse to deal, rather than in terms of a market analysis.58 With the 
shrinking of the refusal-to-deal immunity under the joint effect of 
Parke, Davis and the implied conspiracy concept, such cases are no 
longer authoritative, but their method of approach remains to 
confuse the issue in other termination cases. Thus, even legitimate 
revisions of distribution patterns may be challenged when such 
action results in the dismissal of one dealer in order to substitute 
another or an integrated marketing system.59 
The aforementioned approach is even less sound in termination 
situations than in abstract reviews of territorial clauses. A dealer's 
distributorship may be cancelled because he failed to abide by a 
restrictive distribution agreement, 60 and in another case his contract 
may not be renewed in order to make way for another, better 
dealer61 or to develop a system of vertical integration. 62 The change 
57. See, e.g., Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964); Walker Dis-
trib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963); Gorham &: Johnson, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp. 308 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963); 
Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 295 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1961); Precision Dynamics 
Corp. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 241 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Julius M. 
Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963); Donlan v. Carvel, 209 F. Supp. 829 (D. Md. 1962); Alpha Distrib. Co. of Cal., Inc. 
v. Jack Daniels Distillery, Lem Motlow Prop., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Cal. 1961), 
aff d, 304 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1962). For other cases dealing with similar allegations of 
collusion, see Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 242 F. Supp. 852 (D. Mass. 1965); 
A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Gray Line New York Tours Corp., 242 F. Supp. 365 
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); C.B.S. Business Equip. Corp. v. Underwood Corp., 240 F. Supp. 413 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Hutchinson v. American Oil Co., 221 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
But see Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 922 (1963). 
58. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 
1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Co., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. 
denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). But see the market analysis explanation of these cases in 
Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U.S. 253, 269 n.8 (1963). 
59. See Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963). 
60. See, e.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 
1959). 
61. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 58 and 59 supra. 
62. See, e.g., Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 
Hutchinson v. American Oil Co., 221 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
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may have been suggested or instigated by a fellow dealer, 68 or even 
by several complaints from fellow dealers. 64 If, however, the partic-
ular restrictive marketing pattern is considered legitimate under 
applicable standards, these considerations should all be irrelevant. 
Other dealers may very well object to a fellow dealer's poaching in 
violation of a territorial provision, but that has nothing to do with 
the legality of the system. 
Only in one special situation would a collective complaint of 
this nature be relevant. There are cases in which the restrictive pro-
vision is introduced into an existing distribution network for the 
first time after a dealer acts against the expectations of fellow 
dealers, as, for example, by poaching on their territories.6G Discus-
sions between the complaining dealers before they call in their 
supplier may be a more common occurrence in such cases than 
when a distribution network is first being created. This is clearly 
a case of initiation of restrictive clauses and, if such discussions 
occur, can be condemned on the strictest theory of conspiracy, but 
should not justify similar condemnations where an existing and 
presumably legal restrictive provision is being disobeyed. 
The appeal of conspiracy theories throughout these areas is 
understandable but meretricious. Admittedly, most of the pressure 
on suppliers to initiate or enforce price maintenance or territorial 
exclusivity comes from the "fair" dealers. Moreover, these practices, 
which particularly concern distributors, rather than competing man-
ufacturers, raise problems that technically deal with section 1 of the 
Sherman Act rather than section 3 of the Clayton Act. But that 
should be irrelevant; the applicable standards should emphasize 
the result of each practice in its economic context rather than the 
circumstances of its evolution. 
The policing of vertical price maintenance seems to be judged 
purely by the application of boycott principles. 66 This approach is 
63. See, e.g., Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963). 
64. See Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 
1963). The court considered the factor of multiple complainants to be vital to the case. 
Id. at 7-8. Compare Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring ·opinion in White Motor. In 
fairness to the foregoing opinions, it should be noted that they purport to reject 
conspiracy counts in instances where a single new distributor persuades the supplier 
to switch to him and away from a previous distributor. But then there typically 
follows a search for "multiple" conspiring parties. For a picture of the resulting con-
fusion, see Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co. of Kan., Inc., 5 CCH TRADE 
REG. REP. 1J 71605 (10th Cir. 1965). 
65. See, e.g., Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963), 
Compare Kessler &: Stern, supra note 29, at 82 n.375. 
66. See United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 862 U.S. 29 (1960). 
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acceptable, since agreements to maintain resale prices are illegal 
per se.67 Thus the only problem is to find an "agreement." Indeed, 
because of the strictness of the foregoing rule, any provision for the 
maintenance of resale prices is bound to fare harshly in the courts, 
and the slightest evidence of a collective arrangement will suffice 
to condemn the practice.68 But so long as an entire network of 
vertical agreements to divide teqitories or customers69 is valid, even 
though engendered by pressures from the retail level, the manu-
facturer's insistence that these agreements be honored on pain of 
non-renewal of dealerships, or termination 0£ existing relationships 
in order to create other arrangements, should be equally valid. 
III. "ATIEMPTs To MoNoPOLIZE" AS.A CHALLENGE 
TO MARKETING .ARRANGEMENTS 
A growing number of complaints allege that a termination of a 
dealer in favor of another dealer, or in favor of vertical integration, 
is part of an attempt to monopolize local distribution of the sup-
plier's products in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.7° For 
67. See note 27 supra. As an original proposition, this rule can be criticized. Vertical 
price fixing and vertical exclusive territory arrangements are equally good or bad. Such 
practices inhibit competition at the distribution level, but only in the one product 
involved. Manufacturers' business motive& for setting up a network of distributors 
who are bound to &ell only at a certain price, and for setting up a network of exclusive 
territories, are essentially similar. The different approaches of Dr. Miles and White 
Motor are therefore anomalous. One practical justification for the differing results 
may be that suppliers carefully weigh the relative cost of indulging in territorial 
security, whereas less reflection may accompany price maintenance decisions, since 
the cost of the latter practice to the supplier is less apparent; See Tel&er, Why Should 
Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. LAw &: EcoN. 86 (1960). 
68. See note 36 supra. In other words, the only threshold requirement in such 
cases is the existence of an agreement; indeed, coercion now substitutes for agree• 
ment to some undefined extent. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 u:s. 13 
(1964); cf. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 
U.S. 963 (1961). For an explanation of this development, see note 86. infra and accom-
panying text. Compare Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 624, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3245 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1966). 
69. If White Motor represents the substantive law in this area, it may be unrealistic 
to assume that end-customer restrictions can be valid. See White Motor Co. v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 253, 272-75 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
70. For some interesting recent efforts to apply this doctrine in ordinary dis-
tribution situations, &ee Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp., 370 
U.S. 690 (1962); Best Advertising Corp. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 
1965); Laundry Equip. Sales Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964); 
Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476, 480 (E.D. Mo. 
1965); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 241 F. Supp. 259 
(E.D.S.C. 1965); Hutchinson v. American Oil Co., 221 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1963); 
Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Poster 
Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 198 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ga. 1961), aff'd, 
305 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1962). Compare H. E. Fletcher Co. v, Rock of Ages Corp., 326 
F.2d 13 {2d Cir. 1963); A-1 :Business Machs. Co. v. Underwood Corp., 216 F. Supp. 36 
(E.D. Pa. 1963). 
686 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:671 
reasons similar to those advanced against the use of the boycott 
concept, it would seem that marketing arrangement problems need 
not and should not-at least not primarily-be resolved through 
the use of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
The most common point of confusion involves the correct stand-
ards for definition of the geographic or product market within which 
the attempt is alleged to have taken place. Some authorities point 
to standards as high as those applied in straight monopolization 
cases, which define the market broadly through conventional eco-
nomic analysis and thus diminish the relative position, and thereby 
the vulnerability to attack, of the supplier.71 Other authorities seem 
to have applied less rigorous standards72 by adopting an analogy to 
conspiracy cases,73 in which actual power to achieve the desired 
result is regarded as unnecessary. If the latter standard were accepted 
for attempt cases, its application to marketing situations would 
again raise the danger of automatic illegality. Although the addi-
tional requirement of a specific intent to monopolize might be an 
important and appropriate barrier to such results, nevertheless 
specific intent is generally found in the "viciousness" of the acts 
constituting the attempt. In marketing cases, the admittedly restric-
tive and often exclusionary provision being policed or imposed by 
the manufacturer too readily qualifies for that label. 
Some courts are accepting, perhaps too readily, the validity of 
charges brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act on the basis 
of an admittedly restrictive provision and an inadequately defined 
market.74 This practice, if accepted, in effect would subvert the 
examination that should properly be made: application of the appro-
priate substantive standards to the total restrictive arrangement 
pattern in its market context.75 It is not reasonable to accept a 
complaint under section 2 of the Sherman Act if the marketing 
system in question would not be illegal under some other provision 
such as section 3 of the Clayton Act. Since the Clayton Act is in one 
71. For recent arguments for this position which distinguish attempts to monopolize 
from conspiracies to monopolize, sec United States v. Chas. Pfizer &: Co., 245 F. Supp. 
737 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); :Becker v. Safclitc Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625, 637 (D. Kan, 
1965). Sec also A-1 :Business Machs. Co. v. Underwood Corp., 216 F. Supp. 36 (E.D, 
Pa. 1963); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir, 1959). 
72. Sec, e.g., :Bragcn v. Hudson County News Co., 321 F.2d 864 (3d Cir, 1963); 
Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz :Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Ind, 1962). 
73. Occasionally the allegation in these cases is of a conspiracy to monopolize, Sec, 
e.g., Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Elec., Inc., 295 F.2d 573 (7th Cir, 1961). 
74. Sec cases cited in note 72 supra. 
75. For a proper analysis under § 2 of the Sherman Act of the marketing context, 
sec Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964). 
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sense designed to head off incipient but not yet full-blown viola-
tions of the Sherman Act,76 such a practice is indefensible in light 
of the interrelationship of the two statutes. Finally, certain restric-
tive vertical marketing provisions, such as territorial exclusivity, 
do not fall under section 3 of the Clayton Act, and therefore must 
be judged under the Sherman Act.77 If these marketing arrangements 
are being attacked under section 2 of the Sherman Act in order to 
avoid the conspiracy requirements of section l, a proper application 
of these section 1 requirements, as discussed below, would remove 
the pressure for such allegations. Here too, as in the l?oycott situa-
tions, an objection to the developing practice should be registered. 
IV. THE CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF "AGREEMENT" IN 
VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION SITUATIONS 
The foregoing discussion has emphasized the need to differen-
tiate the problem of when a practice is illegal from the problem of 
proving the existence of the practice. It will now be helpful to 
discuss the latter problem in isolation, and to deal separately with 
restrictions falling under section I of the Sherman Act and under 
section 3 of the Clayton Act. It may then be possible to relate the 
"agreement" requirements of these two statutes and to suggest a 
single, easily applied concept of "agreement" suitable for all re-
strictive marketing provisions falling under either statute. 
The Clayton Act requirement is in one sense the easier to 
satisfy. All that is needed is a finding that a "condition" has been 
unilaterally imposed by the supplier. It is not necessary to show 
assent on the part of the distributor.78 Although theoretically a 
supplier is still free to maintain resale price levels by announcing 
the terms on which he will deal with distributors, such action 1s 
nevertheless not legal in the tie-in or exclusive dealing fields. 
76. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962); Standard 
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1922). 
77. See note 88 infra and cases cited in note 8 supra. 
78. Specifically, § 3 of the Clayton Act provides: "Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful 
for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or 
make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies 
or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or 
resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia 
or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, 
or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on 
the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall 
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of 
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding 
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any 
line of commerce." 
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There exists, however, another, ostensibly judge-made, hurdle 
under the Clayton Act. A notion has wormed its way into the field 
to the effect that only consummated agreements can violate that stat-
ute. 79 According to this rule, mere efforts to obtain agreement, or 
termination of the relationship for refusal of the dealer to cooperate, 
supposedly do not suffice for a violation of section 3 of the Clayton 
Act.Bo In actual practice, however, most courts seem to ignore this 
rule.Bi Whatever its reception, this notion seems unsound, since it 
confuses substantive standards of legality with questions of remedy. 
The illegal characteristic of such an arrangement is the pattern, 
which exists whether or not the particular complaining distributor 
assented to it or refused to cooperate. If an illegal pattern exists, the 
complaining distributor need not show he was part of it in order to 
recover for the harm visited upon him by virtue of the manufac-
turer's _effort to create or maintain it.B2 Efforts to justify recovery 
on finespun if reasonable theories of implied conspiracy are not 
really needed.BS The illegality of the practice in the total context 
is enough to allow the next step to be that of proving damages, 84 
79. The cases so holding are reviewed and criticized in Turner, The Definition of 
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 
75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 692-94 (1962). Much of what follows in the text is either an 
extension of, or a borrowing from, the Turner discussion. Sec id. at 695-703. Certainly 
Turner was concerned with this problem and was critical of the "executed transac• 
tion" requirement. I think subsequent cases permit different and perhaps clearer 
reflection upon the matter. See also Kessler 8: Stem, Competition, Contract, and 
Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 83-86 (1959). 
80. This doctrine is further explained in Barber, Refusals To Deal Under the 
Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 847, 860 n.52 (1955), and is criticized as 
being surmountable under implied conspiracy doctrines, in Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 
581 (1953). See the review of cases and comments in OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAws 716-18 (2d ed. 1959). 
81. I do not believe the doctrine is understood or, more to the point, followed by 
the courts. One example of this, though distinguishable, is given by Turner, supra 
note 79, at 693 n.53. See also Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 574 (4th Cir. 
1963); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1963); 
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 
221 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Albert H. Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos 8: 
Rubber Co., 220 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
82. It is now reasonably certain that the disadvantaged distributor has standing 
to recover damages for a violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act, even though the statute's 
aim tends more to the protection of competitive suppliers. See Bales v. Kansas City Star 
Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964). See also Turner, supra note 79, at 693-94 n.54. 
83. In other words, proof of the "condition" or "understanding" that the purchaser 
must refrain from handling non-competing products, for example, was usually less 
difficult than proof of a conspiracy under the Sherman Act. In the former situation, 
the success of the manufacturer in keeping dealers in line with his "announced policy" 
suffices; in the latter case, some (diminishing) attention is still paid to the means used. 
84. See Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 571-72, 572 n.8 (4th Cir. 1963). 
In a rare case there may be no proof of a pattern of conduct by the supplier; then, 
if indeed the arrangement is challengeable at all, there would have to be a showing 
of a specific (probably vertical) contractual arrangement between the complaining 
February 1966) Boycotts and Restrictive Arrangements 689 
at least where there is some relationship between the practice and 
the plaintiff's losses.85 
Admittedly, this analysis either permits different results depend-
ing upon whether the restrictive provision is judged under sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act, or it 
proves too much in that it is somehow also available in cases under 
section I of the Sherman Act despite that section's conspiracy re-
quirements. If either criticism is valid, it would be preferable for 
the moment to concede the first. The shortcut in Clayton Act situa-
tions is based on the fact that the statute leads to, and indeed 
requires, a finding of illegality only after the entire practice has 
been reviewed. 
In fact, however, the same shortcut is making its way into the 
cases under section I of the Sherman Act, under the misunderstood 
rubric, "pattern of coercion."86 Two recent decisions have indicat~d 
that the successful imposition of resale price maintenance as a total 
pattern is on its way to becoming an automatic violation of the 
statute.87 In other words, the conspiratorial or collective element 
in section I of the Sherman Act is being dispensed with. 
distributor and the supplier. See South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650, 
654 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Albert H. Cayne Equip. Corp. v. Union Asbestos &: Rubber Co., 
220 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). To reemphasize the point: the use of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act instead of § 3 of the Clayton Act should be unnecessary in the usual case, 
and unhelpful in the rare case. 
It .has been suggested that the whole problem under discussion could be resolved 
from the point of view of damages, by denying recovery unless the private plaintiff 
showed public injury. See Timberlake, The Public Injury Aspect of Private Treble 
Damage Actions, 8 .ANTrntusr BuLL. 781, 790 (1963). This assumes that public injury 
and the substantive law of vertical restrictions are one and the same thing, an assump• 
tion that has not yet been articulated by the courts. In any event, it does not preclude 
the flight to "conspiracy" allegations to avoid the public injury (or substantive law) 
requirement. See also Kessler &: Stem, supra note 79, at 97-98. 
85. The relationship between the illegal practice and the plaintiff's harm may occa-
sionally cause difficulties, but viewing the private remedy as a deterrent usually sug-
gests the amr1ver. For example, a supplier may terminate a distribution agreement 
on the ground that a distributor will not abide by, or accede to, an "illegal" restriction. 
Damages should be recoverable in such a case. Similarly, the supplier may have been 
motivated ·by a desire to enter into a different distribution arrangement which hap-
pens to be "illegal," and the illegal aspect might not have been the factor which 
resulted in the distributor's termination. Nevertheless, damages may well be recover-
able. Finally the supplier may have terminated the distributor in order to end an illegal 
situation; the problem of damages in this case is another matter. They may be 
recoverable, but not because of the termination. 
86. See Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 
U.S. 963 (1961). While purporting to require an express agreement in order to estab-
lish a conspiracy, the court made the coerciveness of the TBA tie-in there involved 
the practical equivalent of an "agreement." See the earlier but relevant discussion of 
"coercion" in Kessler &: Stem, supra note 79, at 105-06 and n.478. 
87. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil 
Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). 
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This is not as significant or radical a development as may appear 
at first glance. Apart from resale price maintenance cases, in which 
the conspiracy requirement had already become very attenuated, the 
only situations in which this "pattern" or "pattern of coercion" 
approach will be interesting are the territorial and customer restric-
tion cases. All others-exclusive dealing and tie-in cases particularly 
-are handled under section 3 of the Clayton Act, where this non-
conspiratorial pattern approach is appropriate in any event.88 If 
the pattern approach is appropriate in the latter situations, then it is 
equally appropriate for territory and customer restriction arrange-
ments, since their legality or illegality as a matter of substantive 
law also depends upon the "total picture" review used under sec-
tion 3 of the' Clayton Act. Indeed, to come full circle, the appli-
cation of this "pattern of coercion" approach to such resale price 
maintenance cases as Parke, Davis is also desirable. There, too, the 
real issues are the same, 89 and the red herring of collective boycott 
or impiied conspiracy can easily be discarded. Where a true con-
spiracy finding is essential, the "legitimate refusal to deal v. boycott" 
antithesis may still be significant. Clayton Act cases, however, need 
no such finding, and the limited group of Sherman Act situations 
discussed above should likewise need none. "Coercion" is as good 
a substitute for "contract, conspiracy or combination" as is "invita-
tion to a common end" -at least in the vertical distribution field. 
A successful network provides a substitute for the unambiguous 
horizontal conspiracy.90 
If the formal objection is made that the "conspiracy" require-
ment of section I of the Sherman Act must be honored explicitly, 
it is fair to reply that the implied conspiracy doctrines that were 
decisive in Interstate Circuit and Parke, Davis are flexible enough to 
include result-oriented descriptions such as "pattern of coercion."01 
In sum, if a marketing practice viewed in the entire market context 
is, abstractly seen, illegal, there should be no need to search for an 
agreement upon which to base a complaint. If it is not, boycott 
concepts should not be used to bootstrap the practice into illegality. 
88. Some situations which seem to fall within § 3 of the Clayton Act must be 
brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act for minor reasons of statutory scope, See, 
e.g., Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 
963 (1961). 
89. That is, the interplay between increased inter-brand competition and decreased 
intra-brand competition is similar. See Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 
F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Hutchinson v. American Oil Co., 221 F. Supp, 728 
(E.D. Pa. 1963). 
90. See Turner, supra note 79, at 692. 
91. See also note 36 supra. 
